Minxin Pei's Think Again: Asia's Rise

Think Again: Asia's Rise
By Minxin Pei
Published on Foreign Policy, 22 June 2009

Don't believe the hype about the decline of America and the dawn of a new Asian age. It will be many decades before China, India, and the rest of the region take over the world, if they ever do.

"Power Is Shifting from West to East."

Not really. Dine on a steady diet of books like The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East or When China Rules the World, and it's easy to think that the future belongs to Asia. As one prominent herald of the region's rise put it, "We are entering a new era of world history: the end of Western domination and the arrival of the Asian century."

Sustained, rapid economic growth since World War ii has undeniably boosted the region's economic output and military capabilities. But it's a gross exaggeration to say that Asia will emerge as the world's predominant power player. At most, Asia's rise will lead to the arrival of a multi-polar world, not another unipolar one.

Asia is nowhere near closing its economic and military gap with the West. The region produces roughly 30 percent of global economic output, but because of its huge population, its per capita gdp is only $5,800, compared with $48,000 in the United States. Asian countries are furiously upgrading their militaries, but their combined military spending in 2008 was still only a third that of the United States. Even at current torrid rates of growth, it will take the average Asian 77 years to reach the income of the average American. The Chinese need 47 years. For Indians, the figure is 123 years. And Asia's combined military budget won't equal that of the United States for 72 years.

In any case, it is meaningless to talk about Asia as a single entity of power, now or in the future. Far more likely is that the fast ascent of one regional player will be greeted with alarm by its closest neighbors. Asian history is replete with examples of competition for power and even military conflict among its big players. China and Japan have fought repeatedly over Korea; the Soviet Union teamed up with India and Vietnam to check China, while China supported Pakistan to counterbalance India. Already, China's recent rise has pushed Japan and India closer together. If Asia is becoming the world's center of geopolitical gravity, it's a murky middle indeed.

Those who think Asia's gains in hard power will inevitably lead to its geopolitical dominance might also want to look at another crucial ingredient of clout: ideas. Pax Americana was made possible not only by the overwhelming economic and military might of the United States but also by a set of visionary ideas: free trade, Wilsonian liberalism, and multilateral institutions. Although Asia today may have the world's most dynamic economies, it does not seem to play an equally inspiring role as a thought leader. The big idea animating Asians now is empowerment; Asians rightly feel proud that they are making a new industrial revolution. But self-confidence is not an ideology, and the much-touted Asian model of development does not seem to be an exportable product.

"Asia's Rise Is Unstoppable."

Don't bet on it. Asia's recent track record might seem to guarantee its economic superpower status. Goldman Sachs, for instance, expects that China will surpass the United States in economic output in 2027 and India will catch up by 2050.

Given Asia's relatively low per capita income, its growth rate will indeed outpace the West's for the foreseeable future. But the region faces enormous demographic hurdles in the decades ahead. More than 20 percent of Asians will be elderly by 2050. Aging is a principal cause of Japan's stagnation. China's elderly population will soar in the middle of the next decade. Its savings rate will fall while healthcare and pension costs explode. India is a lone exception to these trends-any one of which could help stall the region's growth.

Environmental and natural resource constraints could also prove crippling. Pollution is worsening Asia's shortage of fresh water while air pollution exacts a terrible toll on health (it kills almost 400,000 people each year in China alone). Without revolutionary advances in alternative energy, Asia could face a severe energy crunch. Climate change could devastate the region's agriculture.

The current economic crisis, moreover, will lead to huge overcapacity as Western demand evaporates. Asian companies, facing anemic consumer demand at home, will not be able to sell their products in the region. The Asian export-dependent model of development will either disappear or cease to be a viable engine of growth.

Political instability could also throw Asia's economic locomotive off course. State collapse in Pakistan or a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula could wreak havoc. Rising inequality and endemic corruption in China could fuel social unrest and cause its economic growth to sputter. And if a democratic breakthrough somehow forces the Communist Party from power, China is most likely to enter a lengthy period of unstable transition, with a weak central government and mediocre economic performance.

"Asian Capitalism Is More Dynamic."

Hardly. With the United States brought low by Wall Street and the European economy enfeebled by its welfare state and inflexible labor market, most Asian economies appear in great shape. It is tempting to say that Asia's unique brand of capitalism, by seamlessly weaving together strategic state intervention, corporate long-term thinking, and insuppressible popular desire for material betterment, will outcompete either the greed-devastated U.S. model or the hidebound European variant.

But though Asian economies - with the notable exception of Japan - are among the fastest-growing in the world today, there's little real evidence to suggest that their apparent dynamism comes from a mysteriously successful form of Asian capitalism. The truth is more mundane: The region's dynamism owes a great deal to its strong fundamentals (high savings, urbanization, and demographics) and the benefits of free trade, market reforms, and economic integration. Asia's relative backwardness is a blessing in one sense: Asian countries have to grow faster because they're starting from a much lower base.

Asian capitalism does have three unique features, but they do not necessarily confer competitive advantages. First, Asian states intervene more in the economy through industrial policy, infrastructural investment, and export promotion. But whether that has made Asian capitalism more dynamic remains an unresolved puzzle. The World Bank's classic 1993 study of the region, "The East Asian Miracle," could not find evidence that strategic intervention by the state is responsible for East Asia's success. Second, two types of companies-family-controlled conglomerates and giant, state-owned enterprises-dominate Asia's business landscape. Although such corporate ownership structures enable Asia's largest companies to avoid the short-termism of most American firms, they also shield them from shareholders and market pressures, making Asian firms less accountable, less transparent, and less innovative.

Finally, Asia's high savings rates, by providing a huge pool of indigenous capital, undeniably fuel the region's economic growth. But pity Asia's savers. Most of them save because their governments provide inadequate social safety nets. Government policies in Asia penalize savers through financial repression (by keeping deposit rates low and paying household savers measly returns on their savings) and reward producers by subsidizing capital (typically through low bank lending rates). Even export promotion, ostensibly an Asian virtue, seems overrated. Asian central banks have invested most of their massive export surpluses in low-yielding, dollar-dominated assets that will lose much of their value due to the long-term inflationary pressures generated by U.S. fiscal and monetary policies.

"Asia Will Lead the World in Innovation."

Not in our lifetime. If you look only at the growing number of U.S. patents awarded to Asian inventors, the United States appears to have a dramatically receding edge in innovation. South Korean inventors, for example, received 8,731 U.S. patents in 2008-compared with 13 in 1978. In 2008, close to 37,000 U.S. patents went to Japanese inventors. The trend seems sufficiently alarming that one study ranked the United States eighth in terms of innovation, behind Singapore, South Korea, and Switzerland.

Reports of the death of America's technological leadership are, to paraphrase Mark Twain, greatly exaggerated. Although Asia's advanced economies, such as Japan and South Korea, are closing the gap, the United States' lead remains huge. In 2008, American inventors were awarded 92,000 U.S. patents, twice the combined total given to South Korean and Japanese inventors. Asia's two giants, China and India, still lag far behind

Asia is pouring money into higher education. But Asian universities will not become the world's leading centers of learning and research anytime soon. None of the world's top 10 universities is located in Asia, and only the University of Tokyo ranks among the world's top 20. In the last 30 years, only eight Asians, seven of them Japanese, have won a Nobel Prize in the sciences. The region's hierarchical culture, centralized bureaucracy, weak private universities, and emphasis on rote learning and test-taking will continue to hobble its efforts to clone the United States' finest research institutions.

Even Asia's much-touted numerical advantage is less than it seems. China supposedly graduates 600,000 engineering majors each year, India another 350,000. The United States trails with only 70,000 engineering graduates annually. Although these numbers suggest an Asian edge in generating brainpower, they are thoroughly misleading. Half of China's engineering graduates and two thirds of India's have associate degrees. Once quality is factored in, Asia's lead disappears altogether. A much-cited 2005 McKinsey Global Institute study reports that human resource managers in multinational companies consider only 10 percent of Chinese engineers and 25 percent of Indian engineers as even "employable," compared with 81 percent of American engineers.

"Dictatorship Has Given Asia an Advantage."

No. Autocracies, mainly in East Asia, may seem to have made their countries prosperous. The so-called dragon economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia under Suharto, and now China experienced their fastest growth under nondemocratic regimes. Frequent comparisons between China and India appear to support the view that a one-party state unencumbered by messy competitive politics can deliver economic goods better than a multiparty system tied down by too much democracy.

But Asia also has had many autocracies that have impoverished their countries - consider the tragic list of Burma, Pakistan, North Korea, Laos, Cambodia under the murderous Khmer Rouge, and the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos. Even China is a mixed example. Before the Middle Kingdom emerged from self-imposed isolation and totalitarian rule in 1976, its economic growth was subpar. China under Mao also had the dubious distinction of producing the world's worst famine.

Even when you look at autocracies credited with economic success, you find two interesting facts. First, their economic performance improved when they became less brutal and allowed greater personal and economic freedoms. Second, the keys to their successes were sensible economic policies, such as conservative macroeconomic management, infrastructural investment, promotion of savings, and pushing exports. Dictatorship really has no magic formula for economic development.

Comparing a one-party state like China with a democracy such as India is not an easy intellectual exercise. Obviously, India has many weaknesses: widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and minimal social services. China appears to have done much better in these areas. But appearances can be deceiving. Dictatorships are good at concealing the problems they create while democracy is good at advertising its defects.

So the autocratic advantage in Asia is, at best, an optical illusion.

"China Will Dominate Asia."

Not likely. China is on course to overtake Japan as the world's second-largest economy this year. As the regional economic hub, China is now driving Asia's economic integration. Beijing's diplomatic influence is expanding as well, supposedly thanks to its newfound soft power. Even China's once antiquated military has acquired a full plethora of new weapons systems and significantly improved its ability to project force.

Although it is true that China will become Asia's strongest country by any measure, its rise has inherent limits. China is unlikely to dominate Asia in the sense that it replaces the United States as the region's peacekeeper and decisively influences other countries' foreign policies. Its economic growth is also by no means guaranteed. Restive secession-minded minorities (Tibetans and Uighurs) inhabit strategically important areas that constitute almost 30 percent of Chinese territory. Taiwan, which is unlikely to return to China's fold anytime soon, ties down substantial Chinese military resources. The ruling Chinese Communist Party, which views perpetuating its one-party state as more important than overseas expansionism, is not likely to be seduced by delusions of imperial grandeur.

China has formidable neighbors in Russia, India, and Japan that will fiercely resist any Chinese attempts to become the regional hegemon. Even Southeast Asia, where China appears to have reaped the most geopolitical gains in recent years, has been reluctant to fall into China's orbit completely. Nor would the United States simply capitulate in the face of a Chinese juggernaut.

For complex reasons, China's rise has inspired fear and unease, not enthusiasm, among Asians. Only 10 percent of Japanese, 21 percent of South Koreans, and 27 percent of Indonesians surveyed by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs said they would be comfortable with China being the future leader of Asia.

So much for China's charm offensive.

"America Is Losing Influence in Asia."

Definitely not. Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and mired in a deep recession, the United States certainly looks like a superpower in decline. Its influence in Asia has apparently receded as well, with the formerly mighty dollar in less demand than the Chinese yuan and the North Korean regime openly flaunting Washington's will. But it is premature to declare the end of U.S. geopolitical preeminence in Asia. In all likelihood, the self-correcting mechanisms in its political and economic systems will enable the United States to recover from its current setbacks.

America's leadership in Asia derives from many sources, not just its military or economic heft. Like beauty, a country's geopolitical influence is often in the eye of the beholder. Although some view the United States' declining influence in Asia as a fact, many Asians think otherwise. Sixty-nine percent of Chinese, 75 percent of Indonesians, 76 percent of South Koreans, and 79 percent of Japanese in the Chicago Council's surveys said that U.S. influence in Asia had risen over the past decade.

Another, perhaps more important, reason for the enduring American preeminence in Asia is that most countries in the region welcome Washington as the guarantor of Asia's peace. Asian elites from New Delhi to Tokyo continue to count on Uncle Sam to keep a watchful eye on Beijing.

Whether it's over blown or not, Asia is poised to increase its geopolitical and economic influence rapidly in the decades to come. It has already become one of the pillars of the international order. But in thinking about Asia's future, let's not get ahead of ourselves. Its economic ascent is not written in the stars. And given the cultural differences and history of intense rivalry among the region's countries, Asia is unlikely to achieve any degree of regional political unity and evolve into an EU-like entity in our lifetime. Henry Kissinger once famously asked, "Who do I call if I want to call Europe?" We can ask the same question about Asia.

All told, Asia's rise should present more opportunities than threats. The region's growth not only has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, but also will increase demand for Western products. Its internal fissures will allow the United States to check the geopolitical influence of potential rivals such as China and Russia with manageable costs and risks. And hopefully, Asia's rise will provide the competitive pressures urgently needed for Westerners to get their own houses in order—without succumbing to hype or hysteria.

Want to Know More?

In IThe Dark Side of China's Rise" (FOREIGN POLICY, March/April 2006), Minxin Pei examines the corruption and waste threatening China's dizzying economic growth.

Well before the "Asian century" fervor exploded, Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn predicted in Thunder from the East: Portrait of a Rising Asia (New York: Knopf, 2000) that the "center of the world" would eventually "settle in Asia". Kishore Mahbubani's The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008) has become the foundational text of the Asian-century school of thought.

The China vs. India debate shows no signs of abating. In "The Next Asian Miracle" (FOREIGN POLICY, July/August 2008), Yasheng Huang makes the case that India's democratic institutions will give it a long-term growth advantage over China. Razeen Sally dismisses that suggestion in "Don’t Believe the India Hype" (Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1, 2009) on the grounds that India continues to neglect its labor-intensive sectors and avoids reforming its institutions. University of California, Berkeley, economics professor Pranab Bardhan has been one of the few respected analysts to reject both the China hype and the India hype, for reasons he lays out in "China, India Superpower? Not So Fast!" (YaleGlobal Online, Oct. 25, 2005).

Not everyone thinks that Asia’' rise implies an inexorable decline in American influence. Anne-Marie Slaughter argues in "America's Edge: Power in the Networked Century" (Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009) that the 21st century will, in fact, be an American one because the United States enjoys unrivaled "connectedness."

Gayle Goh's Do We Owe Our Existence to the PAP?

Do We Owe Our Existence to the PAP?
By Gayle Goh
Published on http://i-speak.blogdrive.com/, 2 May 2006

We have been hardwired since young to be grateful in everything to the People's Action Party. We have been conditioned to accept the abrogation of our democratic freedoms as a necessary inconvenience for the sake of prosperity. We have been primed to forgive any injustice committed by the ruling elite in the name of continued progress under the guidance of benevolent paternalism -- the government knows best.

I remember the issue being discussed countless times in class. Whether in an honestly indignant manner, or in the form of a light-hearted jest, or even a sardonic diatribe, my peers and I have raised our protests against the form of rule present in Singapore to our elders. Time and time again, I have heard the same answer: that is the sacrifice. Freedom is less important than stability. Stability has given us prosperity.

Now, in the heat of the elections, the same thing is once more on everyone's lips. Freedom is less important than stability. Stability has given us prosperity. We owe everything to the PAP. Without them, we wouldn't be here today. After all, there was a time when people said that Singapore won't make it -- but we did!

Let's do ourselves the favour of honesty today, and ask if what the PAP accomplished for Singapore was really such a miracle. Let's ask ourselves if it's been worth the sacrifice.

Singapore has long been known as one of the four East Asian tigers, which also include Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. These countries were part of the Newly Industrialised Economies, which emerged in the 1960's, mostly a product of decolonization, and faced the challenge of industrialisation and development in an increasingly globalised world where other countries had already had a headstart.

Nevertheless, the four tigers followed a generic formula to success; rapid industrialisation and an export-oriented economy, with the aid available from various external agents including the World Bank, the IMF, and of course the then-hegemonic United States, who had virtually reconstructed the post-war economies worldwide in a colossal, unilateral effort. Their currencies were devalued to make their goods cheaper, and foreign advisers were brought into the countries to offer their expert opinions on the situation (the famous Dr. Albert Winsemius, in Singapore's case). The governments focussed their efforts onto education, as well as expansionary fiscal policies to create jobs and stimulate their infant economies.

Singapore had natural economic advantages to help her on her way to achieve the stunning growth she has displayed. Chief among them, perhaps, was her strategic location along major trading routes leading to the Far East, hence Singapore's invaluable contribution to British profiteering in Southeast Asia during the age of colonialism. Bustling port activity had already given her a headstart in development in comparison to Malaysia. In fact, the different nature of Singapore's far more developed, industrialised and high-end economy in the years of de-colonization as opposed to Malaysia's less developed, more agrarian economy was a very big worry on the part of the British, and one of the foremost reasons raised why Singapore should not merge with Malaysia. Singapore had already displayed not only a potential for, but also a track record of prosperity and development before the PAP was ever in the picture.

It is therefore perfectly understandable why, given these natural advantages as well as the favourable climate of the international economy at that time (it was during the period which has been termed the 'Golden Age of Capitalism', lasting from 1947 to 1974, and flanked by the Marshall Plan and the OPEC oil crisis), the East Asian tigers flourished and prospered. So what, if anything set Singapore apart? What was unique about our development strategy?

The answer comes, predictably, in the form of strict governance -- not in the mere presence of strictness, as some degree of authoritarianism was exercised in the early stages of Taiwan's and South Korea's development as well. But Singapore is unique in the extent of its authoritarianism, and the length of time during which this authoritarian rule has been sustained. Labour unions were de-politicised, collective bargaining power restricted, and trade union interests were subordinated to those of the State. [Note: please don't believe a word of what Lee Hsien Loong says when he tries to make it sound like it's better for workers this way because Union leaders have a place in Cabinet. While I applaud his rhetorical twist and his laudable optimism in seeing the glass as half full, let's not kid ourselves -- they are Ministers in charge of the Unions, not Union leaders in charge of the country.] In addition to the labour restrictions, we also saw high levels of government involvement and ownership in production, financing and marketing through the existence of statutory boards. Beyond economics, we also saw a strong government presence in the media, and tight restrictions placed on the freedom of speech, assembly, protest., and so on.

In South Korea, we also did see suppression of labour movements, but this at least came with a guarantee of a minimum wage; the Singaporean government gave us no such guarantee. Furthermore, the proliferation of government/ex-government ministers in so many sectors -- the media, the union congress, etc., meant a depth of intervention unparalleled in the East Asian tigers. Singapore too has been the only country out of the original four to still hang on to its authoritarianism. South Korea has long abandoned the suppression of the labour movement, since 1987 in fact.

What were the results of our authoritarian regime? Lower wages, lots of rich government-linked companies who had access to our national reserves, and people who couldn't complain. Good things in and of themselves, perhaps, but hardly instrumental in Singapore's success. No, that was predicated on the other constants which had held true in South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan who had not embarked on similarly interventionist policies, with the exception perhaps of South Korea, where the chaebols crowded out many competing firms in production, contributing towards South Korea's collapse in the Asian Crisis of 1997-1998. Hong Kong adopted positive non-interference, becoming the most extreme example of a free-market economy in the world, while Taiwan took the route of passive interference, with gradually declining government intervention as the years went on. That's with regards to economics -- with regards to things like press freedom, one only has to look to the Reporters Without Borders' index of press freedom today. South Korea is 48th, Taiwan is 60th, Hong Kong is 34th, Singapore is 147th. Please, don't tell me Singapore's economy will die if we have a free press.

All these countries achieved sterling growth, but the important thing to note is that an all-knowing, clairvoyant, authoritarian government that repressed freedoms and compromised on democracy was not necessary to achieving this growth. The 'constants' earlier mentioned which determined the East Asian tigers' success were factors like the access to foreign aid, available 1st world markets, the Confucian work ethic, et alii. The biggest justifications for our enforced stability, which were capital inflow and the benefits of foreign direct investment, were also constants available to these countries, not exclusive to Singapore in any way. Our contemporaries today enjoy success, progress, and stability with a free media, with labour unions, with less government intervention in the economy.

What are the questions this leads us to ask? Can we bear to admit to ourselves that our carefully-constructed world of police permits and suppressed labour unions and government involvement in large corporations did not need to be constructed for us to be enjoying the benefits of prosperity and consumerism today? If we can admit this, then what is our debt to the PAP? One of gratitude, certainly for their astute leadership. But not one of mindless bondage, not one of servitude, and not one of complete absolution and endorsement of the tactics by which they have achieved success. No longer should we say, "of course things should be this way, otherwise Singapore wouldn't be Singapore". If so, then South Korea wouldn't be South Korea, Taiwan wouldn't be Taiwan, Hong Kong wouldn't be Hong Kong, and Japan wouldn't be Japan. All these economies are either in close competition with us, our ahead of us today.

So the next time the PAP cadres stand up and say, our Ministers must be in our trade union in order for there to be progress and stability, the next time they say we must not have free speech or 'too much democracy' in order for there to be progress and stability, the next time they say the PAP and only the PAP can give us progress and stability, let us remember two things. Let us remember firstly that our economic success was due to a range of other, more instrumental factors which had to do with luck, coincidental timing and natural advantage, rather than suppression. Then let us remember also, that progress and stability, movies, toys, games, fabrics, gadgets, dollars and cents, are not the sum and whole of human welfare, which must include always the dignity of choosing the proxies by which we govern our own lives as a mature and civic society free of fear, oppression and systematic propaganda. Let us no longer accept excuses.

First day in Korea

It is 5.17a.m. in Korea now (Korea's time zone is GMT+9, whereas Singapore's is GMT+8). After two generally unenjoyable flights on China Eastern Airlines, Fifi and I have finally safely landed in Korea, and we are now relaxing at Ah Mah's place, which is partially underground. There is an advantage to it - her home is relatively more sheltered from the cruelly sweltering heat of the sun in the day during summer as compared to apartments located on higher levels, and at night her room temperature is comfortably low to mercifully ensure a good night's sleep.

Later in the morning we are going to Korea University to settle Fifi's administrative matters, and just now Ah Mah brought us to this quaint little restaurant which serves really delicious traditional Korean cuisine - the grilled beef was addictively yummy. (In general, I still dislike Korean food though.) Ah Mah challenged us to call over the waiter in Korean, and I took on her challenge a tad too enthusiastically I suppose - hopefully I didn't attract too much unwanted attention, heh heh. Basically I just screamed somewhat loudly, "YO-GI-YO!" And the waiter immediately came over to attend to us.

It feels strangely surreal being in an unfamiliar land where everyone around you speaks a completely foreign tongue. Every road sign is written in an unknown language I don't understand and every person is communicating in words with which I am totally unacquainted - words which perhaps possess poetry that I fail to grasp, sentences whose syntax I am unable to fully appreciate, paragraphs whose contents are regrettably not delivered to me due to my own inadequacy. When the three of us took the airport bus from Incheon International Airport (which is located in the suburbs) to Ah Mah's home, all the passengers around us were conversing heartily in Korean; and as the bus sped unobstructed on the empty roads, I felt as if I was in a dream-like situation as I watched the trees go by and by.

Speaking of the loss in translation of the beauty of certain languages, Ah Mah and I chanced upon this very topic in our conversation just now, and we were pointing out that several words in Mandarin cannot be faithfully translated into English - there is bound to be some sacrifice of the subtlety, of the uncertainty, of the ambivalence of certain Mandarin expressions in the endeavour of explaining them in English. The ambiguity, which so enticingly straddles the definitions of numerous English words, entirely eludes succinct encapsulation, for there is no exact equivalent of it in English, and the best we can do is to sadly settle for less, while unwillingly harbouring this nagging feeling that something in ourselves remains stubbornly unspoken.

Anyway Fifi brought along a Korean phrasebook which contains some seriously comical phrases which range from the downright bizarre ("He is still alive" - I don't want to imagine the context in which this would even come into use) to the amusingly tragical ("I was raped"). There is nothing hilarious about being sexually assaulted, of course - but what is so funny is really the image of a foreign woman, being utterly battered and raped, walking into a police station with bruises and torn garments that can barely conceal her violated body, struggling to flip to the correct page in the phrasebook and then reading aloud to the policeman in Korean, "I was raped."

Ah Mah's house is located in the vicinity of Yosei University (one of the top three colleges in Korea - the other two are Korea University and Seoul National University, and they are jointly known as the SKY), and just now while Fifi stayed home to prepare her administrative work, Ah Mah and I took a nice lovely walk around the neighbourhood, traipsing across part of the Yosei campus, soaking up the silence of the night. A few students could be seen sitting on benches, engaged in intimate chatter, while a few others jogged quietly in the still darkness that was illuminated only vaguely by the streetlamps. The night air is amazingly fresh - it is so beautifully crisp and cool that it is truly rejuvenating. In the midst of the soothing night, in the face of the approaching dawn, the city is still very much energetically alive - many shops and eateries still welcome customers at 3a.m., and their garish presence is announced with a particular reticence that perhaps only they could perfect. Occasionally I would come across a drunken man or two lying unconscious on the sidewalk, waiting for the ennobling arrival of sobriety; and sometimes I would see close friends gathered cheerfully in one corner, smoking and conversing affably, sharing the sunrise with cherished companions.

Contrary to popular belief, it is actually really safe to wander outside in the wee hours of the morning - Ah Mah and I spent more than one hour just gallivanting aimlessly around the region surrounding her home. She told me some tidbits of information about Korea - for example, in Korea, all the building projects are corporatised, and all the apartments here are privately owned. This inevitably leads to the social phenomenon that the rich is extremely rich while the poor remains depressingly poor - those born with silver spoons in their mouths don't have to work at all in their whole lives, for they can gain wealth just by renting out their inherited property. I expect there to be a significant number of homeless people due to this trend, but so far I have yet to encounter any in Seoul. Ah Mah also brought me to this region where the affluent families congregate - she pointed out that one of the former Presidents of Korea actually lived in one of the long stretches of bungalows.

Anyway, there is a small tunnel near her home which we passed by twice throughout our walk. There is some graffiti artwork painted inside the tunnel, and Ah Mah said that she'd like to draw something on its wall some day as well. Hopefully we'll get a chance to do it together before I return to Singapore.

I hate kimchi but it is okay

Dear all, tomorrow Fifi the Magical Unicorn and I will be going to Korea. Fifi will be attending the 6-week summer programme at Korea University, whereas I'll be staying in Korea for just 2.5 weeks. I have a good friend living in Korea, and I will be moving into her apartment. It has been more than two years since I last saw her, and I really can't wait to see her again!

Those who have been following this blog for a while may be able to recollect that I have written about her before - she is affectionately known as Ah Mah to both Fifi and me. (If you are extremely bored and curious, click here, here, here, here and here to read entries about her. Korean boys generally have very poor taste, which explains why she is still currently single and available. She is very cute, completely unpretentious, reasonably intelligent, highly engaging and she also has a pretty wacky sense of humour. If you are genuinely interested in knowing Ah Mah better, please kindly send your CVs to me - but seriously don't even bother if you are ugly, childish, needy, creepy, socially awkward, boring or stupid - and I will shortlist suitable candidates for more extensive and in-depth interviews. If you don't receive a reply from me, you should get the hint.) Ah Mah acquired that nickname for herself when she expressed her ardent desired to be surrounded by hordes of adorably loving grandchildren in her old age, when she would happily spend all her time gently swaying in a rocking chair, knitting countless sweaters and distributing sweets to her beloved descendants and feeding food to her lazy cat.

I'll be taking a plane for the first time, so I am understandably excited - I seriously can't wait to spend the next 2.5 weeks having fun with my dear friends, reliving old times again.

On public breastfeeding

Courtesy of Agagooga.

Some people think that women should be allowed to breastfeed in public and some even call public breastfeeding a "civil right". They call themselves 'lactivists' and while the silly name is a good tip-off, but it is still profitable to examine their claims.

They put down opposition to public breastfeeding to a view of the breast only as a sexual object, or one of bodily shame.

Yet, it is doubtful if these same activists would support people peeing in public. Assuming you are directing your flow into a proper receptacle and are thus not soiling public or private property, there really isn't any reason to oppose public urination - unless you view the genitals as being exclusively sexual (I am alright with pissoirs since they cover the genitals). Or is there? If people who really need to go can hold their pee and find a bathroom, is it unreasonable for mothers who want to breastfeed to find a similarly private location (indeed, one can breastfeed in any empty room, but it takes plumbing to make a Little Boys or Little Girls Room)?

A similar argument can be made for digging noses in public. In fact, here the issue of sexualisation is moot (talk of the nose having more fun than the finger when you dig it notwithstanding). Simply, where bodily fluids are involved, it is best to keep everything private.

Indeed, if you say that breasts are not sexual, you return to a problem I mentioned before: if breasts are not sexual, then there is no problem with pictures of topless women (any more than there are problems with pictures of topless men), or touching a breast (any more than there are problems with touching a man's chest). After all, there is nothing wrong with touching someone's hand or tapping someone's shoulder. If you are normal, this is not a problem (actually, if you are normal, you acknowledge that women's breasts are not like men's chests, but never mind).

However, the contradictions in lactivism become apparent here. Lactivists want to say that breastfeeding is alright and non-sexual. Yet, if this is so, why are they treated differently from men's chests? Although they are committed to public breastfeeding, lactivists still want to say that a woman's body is sacred and should not be violated. So the only way out is to declare the whole body sacrosanct, at which point we know we have hit upon an argumentum ad absurdum - since only the battiest lactivists would say that one's hands and shoulders should be sacred as well.

One of the only ways to rescue lactivism is if you create several categories: Can see, can expose, can touch (hands, shoulders); Can't see, can't expost, can't touch (genitals) and Can't see, can expose, can't touch (torso). If these categories sound tortured it's because they are gotten by working backwards from a conclusion: women can do anything they want, but if men act upon these implications they are evil.

Another way to rescue lactivism is to claim that breasts are sexual *except* when they are being used to breastfeed. This is a little peculiar, since a gun, for example, does not cease to become a martial symbol when used in hunting, parades or mounted above the fireplace. Perhaps this claim is inspired by the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation, but goes one up on it, for unlike the Body and Blood of Christ, Breasts can endlessly move between the Sexual and Non-Sexual states.

In fact, if you support public breastfeeding, I don't think there's very far to go to support public nudity (or at least public toplessness by women), unless you impute quasi-mystical significance to the act of breastfeeding your child (which probably explains why we have the Gabriel Break-Away Feeding Pad (a feeding harness - I saw one which actually replicates breasts and looks like a bra, but can't find where it is online right now).

But then, even if I impute quasi-mystical significance to the act of sex, it doesn't mean that I should be allowed to have sex in public (assume for the sake of argument that I am impoverished and cannot afford a hotel room, or that since Hotel 81 has been forbidden from offering hourly rates, I have nowhere to go). Ditto for any religious significance I might attach to an act of, say, public defecation (even if I clean up after myself).

An alternative argument could be made about breastfeeding being temporary, whereas public nudity is an extended performantive act, but it seems weak to me and in any case sounds like it is making excuses for breastfeeding (like how those sanitary pads which don't rustle are supposed to make menstruation even more shameful than it is), so the activists are not going to use that line of argument.

Perhaps the best solution is something I saw one mother doing - covering your breastfeeding baby under a shawl or something similar.

Naturally, after I posted a short thought on Twitter (unfortunately, micro-blogging lacks context) I got engaged by some lactivists.

Besides repeated ad hominem insults ("Grow up and get a clue!"; "Growup & educate urself"; "you're DENSE and creepy"; "I don't know what strange planet you came from, but go back there."; "idiot")*, their objections were that:

* - Significantly, the only civil Lactivist was a guy. Make of that what you will.

1) Breastfeeding is okay because it benefits other people
2) Breastfeeding is just feeding a baby. Other people can eat in public, so why can't babies?
3) "it's only a recent anthropologic phenom for women to be ashamed of exposing breasts in public - not a problem for men - why differ?"
4) Babies are not meant to feed from bottles. Breasts are for feeding babies.
5) Grow up.
6) Hands have a sexual function also but we don't wear gloves to sign our name in public.

My responses were that:

1) If benefiting someone else makes an act okay, what if I bed someone really well? Even if you exclude sexual acts, it wouldn't be very nice for me to dress my friend's festering boil in public.

2) Babies can be fed from bottles. If I chose to eat from a trough in public (au porc), people would be disgusted, but if I did it in private it would be alright.

3) Actually in almost all non-tribal societies,the female breast is covered in polite company. This is not a recent phenomenon at all. The only exception I can think of: [Pre-Meiji] Japan (but even then it was the peasants who did this).

4) People are not meant to wear clothes or take antibiotics either.

If you take the naturalistic argument, human breasts are far larger than needed for milk production. They have an evolved sexual function.

5) *Silent amusement*

6) Do you support public nudity? (the response to this was a dodge and a change of subject)

At this point, I sensed close to zero marginal utility, so I decided to stop.

Well, actually a "RadicaLactivist" then came and engaged me, but I will reproduce only a short part of that exchange here:

"women CAN and should be able to go topless if they choose. Men do. And there is NO reason for a man to bare his breasts IN PUBLIC.

One should never touch/photograph another person without permission. One's dress or activities are irrelevant to basic Human Rights"

I guess the word "Radical" tells you all you need to know and explains the sexism and the disconnect from reality (she claimed those who photograph other people without permission are creeps with cameras)

Later she backpedalled somewhat and claimed she was neutral and going topless was a personal choice but, well.

Suffice it to say that, as usual, when you see the word "Radical" it's a sign to run far, far away; I'll never understand why some groups adopt 'radical' as a badge of pride. I've not encountered a case where it doesn't cover nuttiness.

In America I see more than America

"... There is a country in the world where the great revolution which I am speaking of seems to have reached its natural limits; it has been effected with ease and simplicity, say rather that this country has attained the consequences of the democratic revolution which we are undergoing without having experienced the revolution itself. The emigrants who fixed themselves on the shores of America in the beginning of the seventeenth century severed the democratic principle from all the principles which repressed it in the old communities of Europe, and transplanted it unalloyed to the New World. It has there been allowed to spread in complete freedom, and to put forth its consequences in the laws by influencing the manners of the country.

It appears to me beyond a doubt that sooner or later we shall arrive, like the Americans, at an almost complete equality of conditions. But I do not conclude from this that we shall ever be necessarily led to draw the political consequences which the Americans have derived from a similar social organisation. I am far from supporting that they have chosen the only form of government which a democracy may adopt; but the identity of the efficient cause of laws and manners in the two countries is sufficient to account for the immense interest we have in becoming acquainted with its effects in each of them.

It is not, then, to merely satisfy a legitimate curiousity that I have examined America; my wish has been to find instruction by which we may profit. Whoever should imagine that I have intended to write a panegyric will perceive that such was not my design; nor has it been my object to advocate any form of government in particular, for I am of opinion that absolute excellence is rarely to be found in any legislation; I have not even affected to discuss whether the social revolution, which I believe to be irresistible, is advantageous or prejudicial to mankind; I have acknowledged this revolution as a fact already accomplished or on the eve of its accomplishment; and I have selected the nation, from amongst those which have undergone it, in which its development has been the most peaceful and the most complete, in order to discern its natural consequences, and, if it be possible, to distinguish the means by which it may be rendered profitable. I confess that in America I saw more than America; I sought the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character, its prejudices, and its passions, in order to learn what we have to fear or to hope from its progress. ..."

- An excerpt from Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America

I will be staying in the United States from late August through early January 2010.

任贤齐《伤心太平洋》

离开真的残酷吗
或者温柔才是可耻的
或者孤独的人无所谓
无日无夜无条件

前面真的危险吗
或者背叛才是体贴的
或者逃避比较容易吧
风言风语风吹沙

往前一步是黄昏
退后一步是人生
风不平浪不静心还不安稳
一个岛锁住一个人

我等的船还不来
我等的人还不明白
寂寞默默沉没沉入海
未来不在我还在

如果潮去心也去
如果潮来你还不来
浮浮沉沉往事浮上来
回忆回来你已不在

一波还未平息
一波又来侵袭
茫茫人海狂风暴雨

一波还来不及
一波早就过去
一生一世如梦初醒
深深太平洋底
深深伤心